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IDEAS THAT MATTER: PARTING 
THOUGHTS ON CHARLES BEARD ON THE 
100TH ANNIVERSARY OF AN ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION 
Jessica K. Lowe* 
Charles Beard’s work presents an irony. On the one hand, 
Beard’s An Economic Interpretation is known to historians, 
especially historians of America, as the epitome of a certain type 
of work: one that sees “interests”—or more precisely, economic 
interest—as the primary human motivation in history.1 Beard’s 
book, although discarded in many of its particulars, is still 
influential for its perspective: an unrelenting insistence that the 
American founders were motivated not by lofty ideals (or even 
not-so-lofty ones) but by their certificates and bonds and 
pocketbooks; as G. Edward White puts it, Beard “invited the 
conclusion that interests drove ideas.”2 On the other hand, despite 
this emphasis on interest, Beard was, like his Progressive 
contemporaries, a bit of an idealist himself. As Ajay Mehrotra 
reminds us, Beard saw the goal of all thought as a search for 
“truth”; while he certainly ravaged the “crowned constitution and 
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 1. Jonathan Gienapp, Using Beard to Overcome Beardianism: Charles Beard’s 
Forgotten Historicism and the Ideas-Interests Dichotomy, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 367, 371 
(2014). 
 2. G. Edward White, Charles Beard & Progressive Legal History, 29 CONST. 
COMMENT. 349, 352 (2014). 
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its halo,” Beard did so because, in his words, “the seeker of truth 
must be fearless.” 3 
This irony evokes the full significance of An Economic 
Interpretation. The book’s brilliance is not in its writing—in its 
repetitive analysis or in its catalogue of persons and personalty—
but rather in its moral force—its muckraking4—which casts aside 
popular and scholarly constitutional veneration to expose a rank, 
self-interested underbelly. Beard, as Richard Drake relates, was 
spurred on by his experiences at Oxford and deeply interested in 
the education of and support for the working man; he considered 
pursuing a career as an activist as well as a scholar, and ultimately 
“sought to do both.”5 As a scholar, Beard was indignant – 
indignant about constitutional veneration, yes, but even more 
about the way the “sacred” Constitution had been made a cover 
for “every great national sin – from slavery to monopoly.”6 If the 
Constitution was the national temple, Beard was turning over its 
moneychangers’ tables. This radical speech act, rather than the 
content of the work, is his signal contribution to the 
historiography of the United States. 
After the publication of An Economic Interpretation in 1913, 
a full generation of historians debated Beard’s accuracy. They 
sifted through the framers’ yellowed account books, local court 
records, and centuries-old ruminations on state, government, and 
politics to dispute his claims, arguing about the inaccuracy of his 
reduction of their work and ideas to mere self-interest.7 By 1968, 
as White relates, historian Richard Hofstadter could describe 
Beard’s legacy as an “imposing ruin.”8 Beard and his Progressive 
critique of the Constitution (along with the Progressive ideas of 
“science” that shaped it) yielded ground to a new generation of 
historians, focused on ideology and the distinctively “republican” 
worldview of the founding generation, one fused from a 
conglomeration of English sources, Enlightenment and religious 
thought, and colonial experience, and one which put forth its own 
 3. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Charles A. Beard & the Columbia School of Political 
Economy: Revisiting the Intellectual Roots of the Beardian Thesis, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 
475, 484 (2014). 
 4. White, supra note 2, at 360. 
 5. Richard Drake, Charles Beard & the English Historians, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 
313, 315 (2014). 
 6. Mehrotra, supra note 3, at 497 (quoting Beard). 
 7. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF 
THE CONSTITUTION (1958). 
 8. White, supra note 2, at 349.  
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imperatives for behavior, like virtue and self-restraint.9 On the 
whole, the republican worldview that this “ideological school” 
portrayed was a different “mental world,” as Jonathan Gienapp 
puts it, from our own, one which scholars working in this vein saw 
themselves as translating.10 In the process, they shattered the 
notion that a universality of motivations united the American 
founders with subsequent generations—and that those 
motivations could be reduced to a single factor, rational self-
interest. 
Of course, despite long hegemony, the ideological school 
itself came under threat. One attack came from neo-progressives, 
developing Beardian themes and exploring the framers’ economic 
motives; another focused, also in a Beardian vein, on the 
relationship between the Constitution and slavery.11 But the 
principal challenge was from the turn towards broader, 
transnational history—from new, self-consciously distinct 
paradigms that emphasized empire and the Atlantic world, or 
international history.12 Eventually the point of studying the era 
was to embed America in something broader; to look past 
ideology to questions about the movement of persons, economies, 
ideas, and political forms across space; studying the 
Constitution—particularly as a peculiarly American subject—was 
disfavored unless carefully contextualized by Atlantic themes. 13 
In other works, the Constitution fared somewhat better, 
 9. See Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 
11–38 (1992). This spawned a related argument about whether early America was shaped 
more by these “republican” ideas or by the “liberal” ideas of John Locke. See, e.g., JOYCE 
APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 
1790S (1984). 
 10. Gienapp, supra note 1, at 369–70. 
 11. See, e.g., WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2007); GEORGE VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY, 
POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010). 
 12. See, e.g., ATLANTIC HISTORY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Jack P. Greene & Philip 
D. Morgan eds., 2009); DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING (2003); DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2007). 
 13. See, e.g., LAURENT DUBOIS, A COLONY OF CITIZENS: REVOLUTION & SLAVE 
EMANCIPATION IN THE FRENCH CARIBBEAN, 1787-1804 (2004); MAYA JASANOFF, 
LIBERTY’S EXILES: AMERICAN LOYALISTS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WORLD (2011); 
THEORIES OF EMPIRE: 1450-1800 (David Armitage ed., 1998). As Daniel Hulsebosch puts 
it, the study of the American Constitution became associated, negatively, with the old 
“Whig history,” which “celebrated freedom”; “Constitutional history in particular,” 
Hulsebosch writes, “became a story of the growth of American liberty.” DANIEL 
HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830 4 (2005).  
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particularly in studies on state-building and, of course, in Pauline 
Maier’s beautiful, meticulous history of the ratification effort.14 
This is the historiographical world in which we look anew at 
Beard’s great work. And that work has plenty of flaws. Beard’s 
modernist assumptions, White concludes (echoing the 
predominant scholarly opinion), “fit poorly with those of the 
founding generation.”15 And Adrian Vermeule further reminds us 
that while Beard shaped generations of history, constitutional law 
scholars barely noticed him in the first place—there is a radical 
disconnect, Vermeule suggests, between constitutional history 
and constitutional law.16 On the other hand, Michael Caires 
reports that although Beard’s An Economic Interpretation has 
been largely discredited, his work on the Civil War has fared 
better; in The Rise of American Civilization (1927), Beard and his 
wife Mary Ritter Beard argued, according to Caires, that the “real 
significance of the Civil War was not found in the war itself, but 
in the economic transformation of the North,” and this remains 
the “bedrock” of historians’ views of the period.17 Bartholomew 
Sparrow and Shannon Bow O’Brien defend even Beard’s 
constitutional thought, but lament that his analysis largely 
omitted the mass of propertyless whites, which would have made 
the patterns he finds even starker; Stephen Feldman argues that 
Beard is relevant to modern ideas of constitutionalism.18 Finally, 
Beard also lingers, according to Jonathan Gienapp, in another 
way—his focus on “interest” as a motivating force has left an 
enduring, perhaps unfortunate, interest-ideology cleft in 
historical thinking.19 
Of course, Beard’s legacy also remains salient for its attack 
on constitutional veneration, and a useful corrective to tendencies 
to sacralize that document and the founding. As Mary Ann Case 
 14. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 
1787-1788 (2010). For an example of a history focused on state building, see MAX M. 
EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003). 
 15. White, supra note 2, at 365. 
 16. Adrian Vermeule, Beard & Holmes on Constitutional Adjudication, 29 CONST. 
COMMENT. 457, 463 (2014). 
 17. Michael T. Caires, Rethinking the Second American Revolution: Legal Tender and 
National Banking in the Civil War Era, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 511, 511 (2014). 
 18. Bartholomew Sparrow & Shannon Bow O’Brien, Pulling Punches: Charles 
Beard, the Propertyless, and the Founding of the United States, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 
409 (2014); Stephen M. Feldman, The Interpretation of Constitutional History, or Charles 
Beard Becomes a Fortuneteller (with an Emphasis on Free Expression), 29 CONST. 
COMMENT. 323, 339–42 (2014). 
 19. Gienapp, supra note 1, at 371.  
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asserts, the sacred Constitution against which Beard railed is alive 
and well today, perhaps even resurgent.20 Generations of 
Americans have, as my forthcoming work discusses, emphasized 
our nation’s sacred political text, comparing it and its 
interpretation to the Bible.21 Recently, former House Majority 
Whip Tom Delay even went further when he asserted, “God . . . 
wrote the Constitution.”22 Beardian scholarship calls this 
sacredness into question in a vehement way—one that, as Saul 
Cornell notes, is accepted, at least in its mild forms, by most 
historians.23 
But questioning the sacred Constitution does not translate 
directly into post-modern cynicism, either. Recognizing the 
flawed nature of our constitutional endeavor does not have to 
mean turning one’s back to all claims of justice, fairness, or truth. 
After all, if Beard’s Constitution was economics, his history was 
still science (in its broad sense) with its associated Progressive 
optimism about the discipline.24 Some of that sense of historical 
science has, of course, peaked and washed away with the tide of 
time. But where science itself is no longer an accurate descriptor, 
the search for truth, if a mangled one, still is. In this sense, the 
craft of history itself still gains its force partly through the same 
mechanism that made Beard great—those of dispute and 
corrective. In questioning a sacred national past, and the 
narratives constructed by other scholars, we historians take our 
own measure, and that of those who have gone before—
recognizing the culturally limited nature of their aims and claims, 
while still learning what they have to teach us, for good and for 
bad. 
Even while noting the limits of our own perspectives and the 
biases of our interests (scholarly, if not economic), history 
somehow stops short of being a fully postmodern discipline, made 
 20. Mary Anne Case, The Ladies? Forget About Them. A Feminist Perspective on the 
Limits of Originalism, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 431, 448 (2014). 
 21. Jessica K. Lowe, Sacred Texts, Sacred Interpretation: How America Became a 
Nation of the Word (work in progress) (on file with the author). 
 22. Shandee Ashtari, Tom Delay Claims God “Wrote the Constitution,” 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 29, 2014). 
 23. Saul Cornell, Conflict, Consensus & Constitutional Meaning: The Enduring 
Legacy of Charles Beard, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 383 (2014). 
 24. See White, supra note 2, at 106–08 for a good discussion of Progressivism and the 
legal historiography. Of course, Beard rejected the idea that history was science in its 
narrow sense, relatable to “physics or biology,” but affirmed the scientific method as 
“precious and indispensable,” problematic only when “this method, a child of the human 
brain, is exalted into master and tyrant.” Charles A. Beard, Written History as an Act of 
Faith, 39 AM. HIST. REV. 219, 225, 227.  
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up merely of our own stories about ourselves, camouflaged by the 
past. It is that, of course—stories about, in some ways, ourselves 
as well as our subjects—but it is also more. There is, among 
historians, the sense that what we seek is somehow truth, however 
limited and fragile, buried within archival boxes of dusty letters 
and long-forgotten tomes; that there is something accessible, 
something real, even as we enter into the foreign country of the 
past. Even amidst the clamors of vehement historiographical 
disputes, the vectors of contrasting argument still point to 
something—something real, whose realness is intuitively thought 
to be revealed through layers and layers of modern scholarly 
argumentation and dispute.25 As Beard himself put it, history 
“contains all the exactness that is possible and all the bewildering 
problems inherent in the nature of thought and the relation of 
thinker to the thing thought about.”26 At the same time, the 
historian retains “at bottom a conviction that something true can 
be known about the movement of history.”27 
So where does Beard’s work leave us? Perhaps, in some ways, 
it reminds us that scholarship can be both brilliant and wrong. But 
that slightly misstates it. Because even where Beard is wrong, 
there is something about the book’s orientation, its protest, that is 
also profoundly right. Not because bare economic self-interest is 
a universal, timeless motivator—most historians soundly reject 
such a notion, and Gienapp’s reminder that conceptions of “self-
interest” at any given historical moment are themselves a product 
of culture is a helpful modification.28 But Beard’s rightness is 
something else, something that might just be even bigger than the 
ideology/interest divide. After all, scholarly protest, like its 
political counterpart, is about more than the isolated substance of 
its position, taken on its own terms—rather, it is also about the 
very act of critique, and the relationship of the critique to that 
which is being critiqued. It’s about the world the protest speaks 
to—the current world of scholars and readers and even thinkers 
of history—as well as the historical world that it speaks about. To 
use the language of Beard’s time, history is both a science and a 
moral force, fact but also symbol. Historical truth, in other words, 
is multivalent. 
 25. See, e.g., Barbara Young Welke, “Glimmers of Life”: An Interview with Hendrik 
Hartog, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 629 (2009). 
 26. Beard, supra note 24, at 219–20. 
 27. Id. at 226. 
 28. Gienapp, supra note 1, at 372.  
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Beard’s brilliant book spoke powerfully about his own time’s 
interpretation of the past, and challenged its own subterfuge as 
well as that of the founders. Beard, as Drake observes, “had left 
England with a cause, and it would keep him going at his writing 
desk for a lifetime.”29 His achievement—and those of historians 
after him—is greater than what Vermeule proffers, that of serving 
as an “expert witness about constitutional politics.”30 Historians 
may indeed do that—after all, we’ll take all the relevance we can 
get—but Beard himself demonstrates that they can also do much 
more. Beard’s work was directed not to the courts alone, but to 
the world. He took the Constitution back to the people, at least in 
some ways, by debunking its façade of neutrality and sacredness. 
His work shattered—or at least attempted to—complacency and 
confronted hypocrisy, and had, as Richard Hofstadter later put it, 
“profound and decisive importance.”31 Generations before critical 
legal scholars saw law as entrenched domination, Beard’s critique 
anticipated their claims, warning against the Constitution’s 
supposed neutrality.32 As White posits, Beard’s real critique 
wasn’t merely that interests governed politics—all Progressives 
thought that—but rather focused on indicting those political 
actors for their resistance to “leveling pressures for change.”33 
Whatever the motives of the Constitution’s framers—
economic bonds or social ones, perceptions of their own interest 
or perceptions of republican communal interests—Beard’s 
insistence on their limitations is critical. Beard may not have 
shown up directly in constitutional law scholarship or court 
opinions, in the form of citations or quotations, but his critique 
deeply shaped our perception of that document—ironically, our 
ideas. (On the other hand, maybe his shaping of ideas was not 
ironic at all, since it was at ideas that Beard took aim.) Beard 
seized on the past to make a point about the present—and, as he 
did so, he implicitly pointed out that those who claimed pure 
historical study or legal science were doing so as well, but with less 
forthrightness. At the same time, Beard deconstructed not merely 
for deconstruction’s sake, but with the radical moral end of social 
change in mind.34 
 29. Drake, supra note 5, at 322. 
 30. Vermeule, supra note 16, at 471. 
 31. White, supra note 2, at 350.  
 32. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). 
 33. White, supra note 2, at 363. 
 34. Drake, supra note 5, at 315.  
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In the end, perhaps Beard’s activist jumble of past and 
present offers up a reminder not only about the importance of 
writing what is sometimes called a “usable past,” history that 
matters for today, but also reminds us that we live in a usable past 
as well. Institutions and texts laid down by people far removed 
from the present still hold significant sway. Recognizing the uses 
and authorities of this past, alive and thriving in our midst, allows 
us in turn to move toward the future. We do this not by merely 
dismissing all that has come before, but through confrontation 
and corrective, continuing the flawed but important tripping 
towards truth and justice—the journey upon which Beard so 
fervently insisted. 
 
